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(I) The Smiths failed to produce any evidence to establish a nonconforming animal 
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(ii) The Board's decision that granted the Smiths nonconforming animal rights to 
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the property at the same time for a period of thirty days (30) days per calendar 
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year since the zoning was changed to residential on March 19, 1970. 
(a). The Board improperly counted a calf, the offspring of the milking cow as 
one of two head of cattle for the calendar year of 2009 32-35 
(b). The undisputed evidence also shows that there was not sufficient land or grass 
on Parcel # 08-060-0018 during the calendar year of 2008 to graze any cattle for a 
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(iv) The Board's decision that granted the Smiths nonconforming animal rights 
was arbitrary, capricious, and/or illegal because the Board members declined to 
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cattle housed on the lot owned by the Smiths in making their determination of 
nonconforming animal rights 42-45 
(v) The Board's decision that granted the Smiths nonconforming animal rights 
was arbitrary, capricious, and/or illegal because the owners of the property 
abandoned their nonconforming uses and animal rights 45-46 
(vi) The record of the Smithfield Board of Adjustment filed with the District 
Court'was not accurate and was incomplete 46-47 
ISSUE II: 
Whether Board Member, Reed Toolson was required to disqualify himself for his 
stated bias and prejudices as required under the Due Process Clause 47-48 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
D. CRAIG CARLSEN, 
Petitioner-Appellant 
-vs-
BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT OF THE 
CITY OF SMITHFIELD, A 
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 
Respondent-Appellee, 
DALE SMITH and MARGARET 
SMITH, 
Intervenors-Appellees. 
Appellate Case No. 20110142-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Honorable Court to review this matter on appeal 
under the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(b)(I), (2009). 
The final decision of the District Court's judicial review affirming or modifying the 
decision of the Smithfield City Board of Adjustment was entered by Memorandum 
Decision on or about the 7lh day of January, 2011. [R. 407-417] 
The Notice of Appeal was filed by petitioner in the First Judicial District Court of 
Cache County, State of Utah on February 1, 2011. [R. 418-419] 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
ISSUE I 
Whether the Board's decision granting the Smiths nonconforming animal rights to 
two head of cattle or to two milking cows was arbitrary, capricious and/or illegal for the 
following reasons: 
(I). The Smiths failed to produce any evidence to establish a nonconforming 
animal right use of any building or structure to house animals or to milk a cow on the lot, 
Parcel 08-060-0018 as provided under the provisions of Part B. of § 17.16.060 of the 
Smithfield City Nonconforming Animal Rights Ordinance. 
(ii). The Board's decision that granted the Smiths nonconforming animal rights to 
two cattle was arbitrary, capricious, and/or illegal because there was not sufficient 
evidence adduced by the Smiths with regard to the number of cattle on the property at the 
same time for a period of thirty (30) days per calendar year since the zoning was changed 
to residential on March 19, 1970. The Board improperly counted a calf, the offspring of 
the milking cow as one of two head of cattle for the calendar year of 2009 contrary to the 
provisions of Part A of § 17.16.060 of the Smithfield City Nonconforming Animal Rights 
Ordinance. The undisputed evidence also shows there was not sufficient land or grass on 
Parcel # 08-060-0018 during the calendar year of 2008 to graze any cattle for a thirty day 
period because of the Smiths' other uses of the property to house and graze numerous 
2 
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goats, housing chickens, a pet dog, and the conforming use of the property for a large 
garden area; and the use of the property for the storage of trailers and large amounts of 
firewood. 
(iii). The Board's decision that granted the Smiths nonconforming animal rights on 
the same property that the Smiths previously converted to conforming uses as provided 
under § 17.16.040(A)(2) of the Smithfield City Code was arbitrary, capricious, and/or 
illegal and the conversion of the property to conforming uses constituted an abandonment 
of their animal rights as provided under § 17.16.040(B) of the Smithfield City Code. 
(iv). The Board's decision that granted the Smiths nonconforming animal rights 
was arbitrary, capricious, and/or illegal because the Board members declined to separate 
the cattle housed on the lot owned by Ralph Lynn Erickson with the cattle housed on the 
lot owned by the Smiths in their making their determination of nonconforming animal 
rights on the lot owned by the Smiths. 
(v). The Board's decision that granted the Smiths nonconforming animal rights 
was arbitrary, capricious, and/or illegal because of the abandonment of all nonconforming 
uses of buildings and/or structures and animal rights as provided under the provisions of § 
17.16.040(B). of the Smithfield City Code. 
(vi). The record of the Smithfield Board of Adjustment filed with the District Court 
was not accurate and was incomplete. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The determinative law to determine these issues on appeal are: Utah Code Ann. § 
10-9a-511, et seq.; Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801, et seq.; § 17.16.060 of the Smithfield 
City Nonconforming Animal Rights Ordinance; § 17.16.040(A)(2) of the Smithfield City 
Code; § 17.16.040(B). of the Smithfield City Code; Farm Animal Limited provisions of § 
17.04.070 of the Smithfield City Code; the definition of Nonconforming Use under § 
17.04.070 of the Smithfield City Code; § 17.48.060.C; and § 17.04.040 of the Smithfield 
City Code. Rogers v. West Valley City, 2006 UT App 302, 142 P.3d 554; and Vial v. 
ProvoCity, 2009 UT App 122 % 9, 210 P.3d 947. 
The Standard of Review to review these issues on appeal is that in reviewing a 
grant of summary Judgment, the appellate court considers the facts in the light most 
favorable to the losing party. Ward v. Richfield City, 798 P.2d 757 (Utah 1990); and 
Owens v. Garfield, 784 P.2d 1187, 1188 (Utah 1989). Summary Judgment is appropriate 
only when there is no genuine issues of fact and the moving party is entitled to Judgment 
as a matter of law. In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the appellate courts do not 
defer to the legal conclusions of the district court but review them for correctness. 
Springville Citizens for a Better Comty. V City of Springville, 1999 UT 25, \ 22, 979 
P.2d 332. The appellate court reviews the administrative decision just as if the appeal had 
come directly from the agency and accord no particular deference to the district court's 
decision. Rogers v. West Valley City, 2006 UT App 302, ^ 12, 142 P.3d 554 (quoting 
4 
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Wells v Boa r t I q f [djmtment o f Salt I a L • C ity C mj BC > P 2d 1102, 1104 (I Jt; i! i Ct. 
App. 1997). Thus, the appellate court determines only whether or ilot the decision is 
arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. Utah Code AmI. § 10-9a-801(3)(a)(!^ Patier\nn •. ri>t-h 
County IUL of , Idjustment, 893 I" \2d 602,604 (I Ital I ( : 1. ' • ' w>^ ri ;i, I, > - • ^e 
found to have exercised its discrt lion 1 villi rim I tl u t p i opei I >c n :nt idai ies i u iless its decisic >n is 
arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. A determinalioii ol illegality requires a determination that 
the decision violates a law, statute, or ordinance in effect at the time the decision was 
made. Utah Lode Ann * in-0<i_£nmv,n This determination depends on *>rn~?r 
interpretati* ,; ! , / 
determination, and accord nu deference to the Board. Vial v. Piovo City, 2009 UT App 
122^19. 210 P.3d 947. 
Preservation of issues. Each of the issues raised on this appeal were raised before 
the ^ • " i i . iv u ' ' ;«\ ]l • ' rconsciousness" \N i- :e ^ \ ie 
Board could consider and render a decision oii the issues. 11le Suprenic Loun sci me 
standard in determining whether an issue was properly raised before an adn«"'»Mrative 
agency in Badger v. Brooklyi : nmi ( <- °66 P ?( | 844 at 847 (1Itah 1998). The Supreme 
Coui t ii i Badgei I i lotcd ill! lat it I r lay be ii ia] )pi opriatc I o in i lpose tl ic sai i ic le vel of strict 
waiver analysis that the court 1KV applied to issues or objections iKK --M *i • • I 
court. Badger I, 922 P.2d 75 I I he courts doe not apply a stringent waiver analysis to 
5 
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informal hearing before the various government agencies but instead will adopt a "level of 
consciousness" test, requiring plaintiff to being an issue to the fact finder's attention so 
that there is a possibility that it could be considered. See U.S. Express, Inc. V. State Tax 
Comm% 886 P.2d 1115. 1119. n.7 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (stating that issue must be raised 
to "level of consciousness such that the [Tax Commission could] consider if). 
The Board at page 28 of the transcribed minutes [R. 147] declined to consider the 
issues before them such as the issue of nonconforming use of buildings and structures to 
house animal and milk a cow; abandonment and/or the fencing off of the property to 
covert it to conforming uses. 
McRae: "Well, we can't control where they're milking the cows. The only...only issue 
before us is whether the animal rights exists and what species they are. As far as, you 
know, where the... the milking takes place or where the cattle roam with the ... property, 
we don't have any jurisdiction on that." 
Carlsen: "Well, the property is fence off now, so it..." 
McRae: ^\i wouldn't be an issue?" 
Carlsen: "Well, it's fenced off. So the animals are on... closer to my property rather than 
closer to their residence." 
ISSUE III 
Whether Board Member, Reed Toolson was required to disqualify himself for his 
stated bias and prejudices as required under the Due Process Clause. 
The determinative law to determine this issue on appeal is the Due Process Clause 
6 
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of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Coristitutioi. *>•; •. 
Services, Inc. v. City of Wellsville, 2000 UT 81, 1fl[ 52-54 13 P.3d 581 citing V-l Oil to., 
939P.2dat 1197. 
T! :ie Stand* it d ol Review to review this issi :ie on appeal is thai in reviewing a grant 
of summary judgment, the appellate cc n n; t coi isiders 1 1 ic 1 acts ii I tl i, :" light i nosi t avc >i a b l e tc 
the losing party. Ward v. Richfield City, 798 P.2d 757 (Utah 1990); and Owens v. 
Garfield, 784 P.2d 1187, 1188 (Utah 1989). This issue presents a questions of law that the 
appellate coiirt reviews for correctness, arrordin? no deference 1o (U trial cr>nri nriw> 
appellate court accords a lower cc»iirt*s stau 
conclusion no particular deference, but reviews for correctness. City ofMonticello v. 
Christemen, 788 P.2d 513, 516 (Utah 1990). 
Carlsen preserved lllis issue for appeal by his letter, dated November 5. . n0° and 
November 9,2009. asseil • • i ,. • 
118]. 
ISSUE IV 
W 1 letl lei ll ic Disti ict Court erred ..n. :,\ .;-, discretion in granting the Sn hs" 
Motion to Intervene and wiici-'i-- ! v - * • •- *. i delegate 
their legal duties to a private citizen such as the Smiths in this matter. Also, is the issue of 
whether the District Court abused it discretion in allowing the BOA to join in the Smiths' 
7 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Memorandum after the pleadings were closed. . 
The determinative law to determine this issue on appeal is Rule 7 and Rule 24 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; and Republic Insurance Group v. Doman, 114 P.2d 
1130 (Utah 1989). 
The Standard of Review to review this issue on appeal is that a motion to intervene 
involves questions of law and fact. Moreno v. Bd. ofEduc, 926 P.2d 886, 888 (Utah 
1996). The appellate court reviews the district court's legal determinations for 
correctness, affording no deference to its conclusions. The appellate court does not disturb 
the district court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Because the district 
court has discretion in determining whether to grant permissive intervention, the appellate 
court review denials or grants of rule 24(b) motions to intervene under an abuse of 
discretion standard. The district court abuses its discretion when it relies on an erroneous 
conclusion of law to come to its decision. Kilpatrick v. Bullough Abatement, Inc., 2008 
UT 82 \ 23, 199 P.3d 957. Mandatory intervention under rule 24(a), turns on a legal 
determination, which the appellate court review de novo. //; re Marriage of Gonzalez, 
2000 UT 28, Tl 16, 1 P.3d 1074. The first requirement under both rule 24(a) and rule 24(b) 
is that the intervenor make timely application. Republic Insurance Group v. Doman, 774 
P.2d 1130 (Utah 1989). Use of the word timely in the Rule requires that the timeliness of 
the application be determined under the facts and circumstances of each particular case, 
8 
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and in the sound discretion oi the com I /< 7nm Jt v *< . ' * .t * • *, ; iU/2, 
1073-74 (Utah 1983). The appellate court accords a lower court 's statement of law, 
statutory interpretation, or legal conclusion no particular deference, but reviews for 
correctness '.v . >*. -. .>. ; - - / ^ < ^ t ^ r i - > 1 ^ H ifnh ioon,_ 
This issue was adeqi lately preserved foi ap] :»eal 1 >y Carlson* 5 v /ritten Objecli- ,)i is to 
the BOA consent to allow the Smiths intervention and his Objections to the joindei [R. 
265-267, 391-394], and was preserved during the course of the hearing held before the 
District Court on August 30. 2010. |' I'I 1 20] 
DETERM1NA I I'VE L A W 
The follow in- ordinances, statutes, and constitutional provisions are copied ni tlleir 
entirety in the separate Addendum to Brief of Appellai it 
Utah Code Ami, » • .. i 1, et seq. 
Utah Code Aim. $ 10-9a-sui el sec \ 
§ 17.16.060 of the Smithfield City Nonconfornring Animal Rights Ordinance, 
§ 17.16.010 ^ftlic Smithfield 
§ 17.16.040(AV?K.| !iii-\jMi;'ji;,id Tin Code. 
§ 17.16.040(13). oi :. -
Farm Animal Limited provisions under § 17.04.070 oi ilic Smidilield City Code. 
The definition of Nonconforming Use under § 17.( • .T~ f the Smithfield City Code. 
§ 17.20.010, et seq. o f ih t^nmi i iu - id City Code. 
9 
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§ 17.48.060.C. of the Smithfield City Code. 
§ 17.04.040 of the Smithfield City Code. 
Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Article L Section 24 of the Utah Constitution. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal is from the final decision on a motion for summary judgment filed 
by petitioner regarding judicial review by the District Court that affirmed or modified the 
decision of the Smithfield City Board of Adjustment granting Dale Smith and Margaret 
Smith nonconforming animal rights on property zoned residential which is 
adjacent to the home and property owned by petitioner, Carlsen. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Smithfield City Board of Adjustment at a meeting held on November 4, 2009 
granted Dale and Margaret Smiths existing nonconforming animal rights to two head of 
cattle on Parcel No. 08-060-0018 which is adjacent to the home and property owned by the 
petitioner, Carlsen. 
Carlsen timely filed a Petition for Judicial Review of the Board's decision in the 
First Judicial District Court of Cache County, State of Utah on November 30, 2009. [R. 1-
10 
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27]. 
Counsel of record for the Board of Adjustment contacted Dale and Margaret Smith 
in December, 2009 and notified them of the pending Petition for Judicial Review and 
attempted to arrnnce a se1 ! ' •;!•- - i ^ !•* . ^n • • • N>| 
The Smithfield City Board of Adj uslmu 1 i i u ; = - ^ : = < ; ; n • - wer to 
the Petition for Judicial Review through counsel of record on December 22, 2009. [R. 29-
36] 
The record of nrorocV igs before the Board ^i \ Jui^tment wss h k v = c I );strict 
Court June 7, 2010. [K. j / - i y o j C 'arlsci I l! ici ei; ipc- • iv 
Judgment with supporting memoranda and hand delivered a copy to the counsel of record 
for the Board of Adjustment on June 15, 2010. [R 197-229] 
The i- minimi :,,; ; ,
 ; iv in\ ipoti n- \{\y ; , oniinuance to 
respond to the sunnnary judgmei --po' • the 
Motion for Summary Judgment within the time frame as requiied under Rule 7 ol tlle Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. [Tr. 3] Carlsen filed a Notice to Siibinit the Summary Judgment 
Motion for ;: w ision on It me 29, 2< 11! I \ \ K 284-287] 
Dale and Margaret ^ii! 
Review for period of seven months, filed a Motion to Intervene on June 17, 2009 after 
Caiiseir s summary judgment motion had been earlier filed with the District Court. [11. 
230-249] < ii. ^. u , .i Response to tin1 Mnlion lo Intervene as being untim:!--" rp ^ r 0 
11 
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264] The Board of Adjustment filed a Consent to the Smiths' Motion to Intervene. [R.265-
267] Carlsen filed a Response to Smithfield City's Consent to the Smiths' Motion to 
Intervene: [R. 272-274] 
Carlsen filed a Notice to Submit the summary judgment motion and other 
documents to the court for a decision on June 29, 2010. [R.371-373] 
Oral arguments was held on the Smiths' Motion to Intervene on August 30, 2010 
and the Motion to Intervene was granted by the District Court. [Tr. 1 -20] 
The Smiths filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Carlsen's summary judgment 
motion on September 29, 2010. [R. 300-328] 
Carlsen filed a Reply to the Smiths' Memorandum in Opposition on September 12, 
2010. [R. 339-368] 
The Smithfield City Board of Adjustment filed a Notice of Joinder in Dale and 
Margaret Smiths' Memorandum in Opposition after the pleadings were closed on October 
15,2010. [R.380-381] 
Carlsen filed Objections on October 25, 2010 to the Smithfield City Board of 
Adjustments" Notice of Joinder in the Smiths" Memorandum in Opposition as being 
untimely and being filed after the pleadings were closed and the matter submitted twice to 
the court for a decision under Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. [R. 391-394] 
The respondent, Smithfield Board of Adjustment and the interveners, Dale and 
Margaret Smith did not file a Motion for Summary Judgment with supporting memoranda 
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which would have allowed Carlsen the opportunity to respond to a Rule 56 motion as 
provided by Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DISPOSITION IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
The District Court affirmed and actually modified the Board of Adjustment 
Decision that the Smiths had existing animal rights to two head of cattle. The District 
Court at page 10 of the Memorandum Decision stated that milking cows can be lawfully 
substituted for steers. [R. 416] 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Carlsen purchased a home and property in an area zoned residential in 
Smith field City, Utah on the 6lh day of July, 2007. The home and property are located at 
172 North 200 East and is legally described as Lot 5, Block 20 !4 Plat "A" of the 
Smithfield City Survey and is also known as Parcel # 08-060-0020. [R. 104] 
2. The home and property south of Carlsen's property was and is currently owned 
by Ralph Lynn Erickson and is legally described as Lot 4, Block 20 /2, Plat wiA" of the 
Smithfield City Survey. This property is also known as Parcel # 08-060-0012 and consists 
of approximately 1.45 acres in all with one home and an empty house located on the 
property. [R. 114] 
3. The property located to the east of Carlsen's property is the same width as his 
property and is legally described as Parcel # 08-060-0018 and consists of approximately 
.42 acres of land, 92 feet wide and approximately 199 feet in length. The Warranty Deed 
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which is part of the Board of Adjustment record shows that ownership of this parcel of 
property was transferred from Ralph Lynn Erickson and others to George and Alice 
Jeppesen and recorded in July, 1986. [R. 114, 119] ^ 
4. The property was thereafter transferred from George and Alice Jeppesen to the 
George Jeppesen Family Trust in the year 2005. 
5. Carlsen stated to the Board at the November 4 meeting and in a letter, dated, 
October 4, 2009, that there were no cows on the Jeppesen and Erickson property in the 
year of 2007 when he was in the process of purchasing his home. Petitioner stated that the 
Smiths brought two (2) horses onto the Jeppesen and Erickson property in August or 
September of 2007 for a period of two months and they were removed when there was no 
grass to eat and the horses were eating bark from the trees. [R. 104-107] 
6. Caiiseir s statement that there were no cows and two horses on the two 
properties in the year of 2007 was corroborated by the letter of Gilbert and Martha Hansen 
which states: KiWe have lived adjacent to the property in question for over 40 years. 
During that time there have been cattle or horses grazing there. The Hansen letter fails to 
state the exact number of head of cattle or horses that were on the property at any given 
time during any calendar year since 1970. The plat maps which is part of the Board's 
records shows that Gilbert and Martha Hansen own the home and property. Parcel # 08-
060-0011 which is to the south of the Erickson property and is not located next to the 
Jeppesen/Smith property. [R. 60, 114] 
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7. The Affidavit of George and Alice Jeppesen [R. 56], the former owners of the 
property who sold the property, Parcel 08-060-0018 to the Smiths states: 
I also made arrangements to buy the property to the east of the house where my 
new home was build in 1972. Directly behind, to the south, was vacant land having been 
used for the purpose of farming. Gordon Erickson owned the land. There was an old 
barn that collapsed, which housed many raccoons. There was an old chicken coop 
directly behind my place that eventually collapsed also. During those years 1962 to 1973 
there were chickens, rabbits, cows, horses, and peacocks (which used to perch on my 
balcony) on the property 
When Erickson 's moved to Salt Lake in the 1970's 1 purchased part of the property 
with a right of way. "Emphasis added" 
8. A reasonable inference can be drawn from the Jeppesen affidavit that they built 
the storage building (20f x 30' shed) after the zoning was changed to residential after they 
purchased the vacant land from the Ericksons in the year of 1986. 
9. The Smiths purchased the property directly to the east of Carlsen's property, 
Parcel No. 08-060-0018 from the George Jeppesen Family Trust in January, 2008. The 
Smiths at that time took control of the property, however, the deed to transfer ownership 
was not recorded until October 20, 2009. [R. 113] 
10. The Smiths then converted the nonconforming uses of the property to 
conforming uses such as installing a fixed dog run; installing a fenced enclosure for a large 
garden area, (25? x 120'); and a large fenced area for a chicken coup to house up to 4 pet 
chickens as permitted by Smithfield City ordinances. The fence installed by the Smiths 
ran from west to east along the 199' length of the property. [R. 111-112,116-117] 
11. The Smiths at the same time added an extension onto a storage building and a 
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fenced enclosure to house approximately 7 goats. This area was less than 69 feet from 
Carlseir s dwelling. The Smiths then brought a male goat and housed it in a separate 
enclosure in the middle of the south side of the property. The Smiths also brought 
numerous chickens and housed them in the large chicken coup area that was located on the 
north east side of the property next to the fixed dog run. [R. 104-107] 
12. Carlsen stated in his letter to Smithfield City that the cow had a calf in the year 
2009 and that the Smiths began milking the cow in the 20f x 30' storage building that was 
located less than 100 feet from his dwelling. [R.105] 
13. Carlsen contacted the Smithfield City Zoning Department in the summer of 
2009 to determine how the Smith property was zoned and to determine whether they had 
animal rights to have all of goats, chickens, cow and calf. The zoning department referred 
the matter to animal control officer and Smithfield City determined that the Smiths had no 
animal rights to have goats or chickens. The Smiths removed the goats from the enclosure 
next to Caiiseir s property but replaced the goats with roosters in the enclosure. Carlsen 
sent numerous letters to the Smiths and Smithfield City regarding the nuisance created by 
the Smiths since their purchase of the property. [R. 104-107] 
14. The Smiths removed all animals from the property at the request of the 
Smithfield City Chief of Police until a determination of their animal rights. The Smiths on 
October 20, 2009, filed a written application to the Smithfield Board of Adjustment for 
nonconforming animal rights. [R. 42-49] 
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15. The Smiths' application also contained a outdated plat map [R. 45], whereby at 
the bottom it states: Property of Dale and Margaret Smith 240 E. 200 N. 
1. Shed 20'x 30'. 
2. Enclosure where goats were housed, 12' x 12f and is 16' from Mr. Carlson's 
property. 
3. Gate to right of way on Ralph Erickson "s property. 
4. Garden, which is 25' x 120', we open it up to the cow in the fall. 
5. 
16. Dale Smith at the Board meeting held on November 4, 2009 on page 5 of the 
minutes [R. 124] stated: My understanding from the documentation is we've got there have 
always been cows on there and we are asking that we are allowed to keep cows on that 
property to keep the grass down and to keep them on the Erickson property. (Emphasis 
added). 
18. The Smiths in support of their request to be allowed animal rights on the 
property owned by Ralph Lynn Erickson, provided a letter from Larry E. Draper [R.57] 
which states: This letter is to help Dale and Margaret Smith with their request to have 
animal rights on the Erickson property. There has been beef on that property every 
summer since before J970, and after, up to the present. 
19. The Draper letter was disputed by the Swaner letter, dated Oct. 2, 2009 [R. 55] 
which states: This letter is in regards to Dale and Margaret Smith 's property they have 
had behind their home on 2nd North. Part of this property was purchased from George 
Jeppesen. Ralph Erickson also has horses on his property which is located next to the 
Smith 's property. In addition. George Jeppesen owned the Smith property prior to the 
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Smith's in which he had cows. The property has always been maintained properly with no 
smell or other problems. We the Swaners have lived on the corner of 2nd North and 200 
East. "Emphasis added." 
20. The Swaner letter states that they do not live on the same block as the property 
at issue. However, the letter fails to state the number of cows that were on the Smith 
property at any given time during any calendar year since 1970. 
21. George and Alice Jeppesen letter, dated October 12, 2009 which states: In the 
early 70's my teen aged boys rented the Erickson'sproperty to raise steers. There have 
been cows every year since that time. When Erickson's moved to Salt Lake in the 1970's I 
purchased part of the property with a right of way. I was asked to take care of his 
property while he was away. There have been animals on that property ever since 1962 
when we moved here. [R. 56] 
22. The Jeppesen Affidavit was recanted and clarified by Alice Jeppesen at the 
Board meeting where on page 19 of the minutes [R. 138] she stated: I'm Alice Jeppesen, 
and we owned property that was sold to the Smiths. And until my husband got sick in the 
hospital for two years, we did have COM^S and horses on all that property because we took 
care of the house and property for Ralph, and irrigated it to water many of these things 
and took care of the property for Ralph because he was gone at this time. "Emphasis 
added". 
23. The Jeppesen letter also fails to state the number of steers on the property at 
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any given time during any calendar year since 1970. 
24. A close view with a magnifying glass of the aerial photo [R. 52] taken of the 
property during the summer of 2006 which was furnished to the Board by the Smiths 
shows that there were no animals on the Jeppesen/Smith property or the adjacent property 
owned by the Ericksons. The aerial photo disputes the Affidavits and letters of Larry E. 
Draper, Swaner and others that there were always animals on the two properties. The 
aerial photo which detects the top of a wooden feeder and other objects corroborates Alice 
Jeppeseir s claim that they had no animals on the property for a two year period and 
disputes Dale Smiths and others who claims that there were. 
25. Dale Smith throughout the board meeting asserted that there have always been 
three (3) steers on the property. His claims that there have always been three (3) steers on 
the property was discredited and disputed by his wife, Margaret Smith, whereby on page 
37 of the minutes [R. 156], she states: "Can I make a comment ? I believe we only had 
two cows last year. So, we need to clarify that. Sorry. " 
26. Carlsen stated to the Board on page 19 of the minutes [R. 138], that during the 
calendar year, 2008, the two steers were exclusively on the Erickson property and were 
never on the Jeppesen/Smith property. 
27. The pertinent parts of Margaret Smith's letter, dated, October 29, 2009 [R. 50], 
states: 
When Frank Keepers, on June 25, 2009, came and told us that someone had complained 
about our animals we went in the next day to Smithfield City and talked to Char about 
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what we needed to do. We told her that we were already selling them (because we had a 
milk cow that was due to calf soon) but that we needed time to wean the kids. We had 
them sold within three weeks. Two of which we took to the auction because we could not 
get buyers for them. 
When we were told by the chief of police in Smithfield that we needed to remove our 
animals we moved our cow7 and calf that day, Monday, and gave away our chickens on that 
Thursday 
28. The letter of Margaret Smith shows that during the calendar year of 2009 there 
was a cowr and a calf on the Smith property. The calf was the offspring of the milking cow 
and had not attained the age of 6 months before being removed from the property in 
September, 2009 and before the Board meeting held on November 4, 2009. The calf being 
born after Margaret Smith talked to Char in the Smithfield City Offices on June 26, 2009 
would not have attained the age of 6 months during the calendar year of 2009. 
29. The Board at the November 4 meeting held that the Smiths had a existing 
nonconforming animal rights use to two head of cattle. [R. 156-157] 
30. Carlsen in a letter similar to a Rule 60(b) motion, dated, November 9, 2009, 
requested the Board to convene and vacate their decision based upon the false information 
provided by Smithfield City Building Inspector, Jon Wells to the Board with regards to 
ownership of Parcel No. 08-060-0018 based upon the Warranty Deed attached to the letter 
that is part of the record before the court. [R. 118] 
The board did convene on May 10, 2010 regarding the transcript of the minutes that 
are part of the record but declined to vacate its earlier decision. The Board at such 
meeting held that the transcript of the minutes of the November 4, 2009 that was filed with 
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the District Court was not complete and accurate. (Copies of the minutes of the May 10, 
2010 meeting was filed with Petitioner's Reply to the Smith's Memorandum in Opposition 
to the Summary Judgment Motion). [R. 365-368] 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Smiths failed to produce sufficient evidence to establish existing 
nonconforming use of buildings and animal rights which were abandoned. The decision 
was therefore arbitrary, capricious, and or illegal and should not have been affirmed or 
modified by the district court. 
ARGUMENT 
ISSUE I 
THE BOARD'S DECISION GRANTING THE SMITHS NON 
CONFORMING ANIMAL RIGHTS TO TWO HEAD OF CATTLE OR TWO 
MILKING COWS WAS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, AND/OR ILLEGAL FOR 
THE FOLLOWING REASONS: 
(I). The Smiths failed to produce any evidence to establish a nonconforming 
animal right use of any building for agricultural purposes to milk and house cows or 
other animals in any building or structure on the lot, Parcel 08-060-0018 as provided 
under Part B. of § 17.16.060 of the Smithfield City Nonconforming Animal Rights 
Ordinance and other applicable ordinances. 
The Smiths had the burden to establish every element of a Nonconforming use and 
any nonconforming use under the Nonconforming Animal Rights Ordinance, § 17.16.060 
of the Smithfield City Code by the preponderance of evidence. Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-
511(4)(a). 
Part B. of Smithfield's Nonconforming Animal Rights Ordinance, § 17.16.060 
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provides: 
B. To maintain a nonconforming land use, animals and/or fowls must accompany 
lots and/or building for a period of not less than thirty (30) days per calendar year. 
"Emphasis added". 
The general provisions of § 17.04.070 of the Smithfield City Code defines 
nonconforming use as follows: 
NONCONFORMING USE: A use which lawfully occupied a building or land at 
the effective date hereof and which does not conform with the use regulation of the zone 
in which it is located. "Emphasis added". 
Zoning for the area and the Smith property, Parcel No. 08-060-0018 was changed 
from agricultural to residential on the effective date of March 19, 1970. 
The Smiths' application for a nonconforming use under paragraph number three of 
their written application [R. 43], states: 
3. Briefly describe your request: continue to have animal rights on our property in 
order to keep a milk cow, some of our children have an allergy to milk and are only 
able to drink milk if they can drink raw milk. 
Carlsen on page four (4) of the October 4, 2009 letter, [R. 107] which was part of 
the record before the Board stated: 
Assuming, for the sake of argument that the Smith's do have some animal rights to 
have cattle, steers on the property under the common law. They still would not be allowed 
a milking cow that they would be required to milk twice a day. There is a clear difference 
between cattle or a steer grazing on property and people milking a cow in a storage 
building twice a day, particularly when the storage building is less than 100 feet from 
another person's dwelling and had not previously been used as a milking barn. 
Certainly, the use of any building or structure on Parcel 08-060-0018 to milk a dairy 
cow or to house farm animals and fowl in an area zoned residential would constitute a 
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nonconforming use. 
The Smiths in this case failed to produce any evidence that the storage building, (20 
foot by 30 foot shed) existed at the time that the zoning for the described property was 
changed from agricultural to residential on the effective date of March 19, 1970. The 
Smiths failed to produce any evidence that any building or structure currently existing on 
the property had been used to house animals or to milk dairy cows and goats for thirty (30) 
days per calendar year since March, 1970 
The Affidavit of George and Alice Jeppesen [R. 56], the former owners of the 
property who sold the property. Parcel 08-060-0018 to the Smiths states: 
I also made arrangements to buy the property to the east of the house where my 
new home was build in 1972. Directly behind, to the south, was vacant land having been 
used for the purpose of farming. Gordon Erickson owned the land. There was an old 
barn that collapsed, which housed many raccoons. There was an old chicken coop 
directly behind my place that eventually collapsed also. During those years 1962 to 1973 
there were chickens, rabbits, cows, horses, and peacocks (which used to perch on my 
balcony) on the property 
When Erickson ys moved to Salt Lake in the 197 0^s 1 purchased part of the property 
with a right of way. "Emphasis added" 
Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition at page 1548 defines the term [vacant] as: 
Empty; unoccupied; as, a "vacant" office or parcel of land. Deprived of contents without 
inanimate objects. 
A reasonable inference can be drawn from the Jeppesen affidavit and their 
description of the buildings and structures existing during the history of the property that 
the storage building where the goats and roosters were being housed, and the cows and 
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goats were being milk by the Smiths did not exist on the property at the time that the 
zoning for the property was changed from agricultural to residential in the year of 1970. ' • . 1 
The Jeppesen affidavit also fails to make any reference that a dairy farm with dairy cows 
and a milk barn existed on the property at the time that the zoning was changed in 1970. 
The Affidavit of George and Alice Jeppesen shows that all structures and buildings 
on the Erickson property used for agricultural purposes such as to house animals or fowl 
were abandoned by their collapse from deterioration prior to the Jeppesens' purchasing 
part of the vacant property with a right of way from the Ericksons in the year of 1986. 
The pertinent part of § 17.16.040(A)(6) of the Smithfield City Code provides: 
6. A nonconforming building or structure or a building or structure occupied by a 
nonconforming use which is damaged or destroyed by fire, flood, wind, earthquake or 
other calamity or act of God or public enemy, may be restored and the occupancy or use of 
such building, structure or part thereof which existing at the time of such damage or 
destruction, may be continued or resumed, provided that such restoration is started within 
a period of one year and is diligently prosecuted to completion. 
The chicken coup and barn described in the Jeppesen affidavit were not destroyed 
by fire, etc., and no restoration began within a one year period. 
The pertinent part of § 17.16.040(B) of the Smithfield City Code provides: 
1. A use shall be deemed to have ceased when it has been discontinued either 
temporarily or permanently for a period of one year or more, whether or not with the intent 
to abandon said use. 
2. If said nonconforming use is discontinued for a continuous period of one year or 
more, the use shall be considered abandoned and any future use of such land shall conform 
to the provisions of the zone which it is located. 
The pertinent part of Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-51 l(4)(c)(l) provides: 
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Abandonment may be presumed to have occurred if: 
(I) a majority of the primary structure associated with the nonconforming use has 
been voluntarily demolished without prior written agreement with the municipality 
regarding an extension of the nonconforming use. 
(ii) the use has been discontinued for a minimum of one year; or 
(iii) the primary structure associated with the nonconforming use remains vacant for 
a period of one year. 
A reasonable inference can be drawn from the Jeppesen Affidavit that the barn 
located on the Erickson property and the chicken coup located on the land that George and 
Alice Jeppesen purchased from the Ericksons were not rebuilt within one year after their 
collapse from deterioration. Therefore, there has been an abandonment of any structures 
or buildings on the property for agricultural purposes before George and Alice Jeppesen 
purchased part of the vacant property with a right of way from the Ericksons. 
Because the Jeppesen Affidavit fails to give any description or make any reference 
to the storage building (20 foot by 30 foot shed), a reasonable inference can be drawn from 
the Jeppesen affidavit that the building was built on the property after George and Alice 
Jeppesen acquired the vacant land from the Ericksons more than sixteen (16) years after 
the zoning was changed to residential. 
The aerial photo [R. 52] and the plat map [R. 45] showing the location of items by 
reference that the Smiths submitted with their application for a nonconforming use shows 
that the storage building is located on the property directly behind the Jeppesens' residence 
and on the same location where the chicken coop referenced in the Jeppesen Affidavit 
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once stood and eventually collapsed approximately sixteen years earlier. The plat map [R. 
45] at the bottom states: Property of Dale and Margaret Smith 240 E. 200 N. 
1. Shed 20' x 30'. (The location of the storage building is marked on the map by 
reference as [1] which is directly behind the Jeppesen residence). 
The use of any structure or building being built more than sixteen (16) years after 
the zoning was changed from agricultural to residential and more than one (1) year after all 
existing buildings or structures on the property collapsed due to deterioration must 
conform with the use regulation of the zone which it is located at the time the structure or 
building is built. 
The pertinent part of § 17.16.040(B) of the Smithfield City Code provides: 
A nonconforming use shall not be enlarged, extended, or changed unless the use is 
changed to a use permitted in the district in which it is located, and a nonconforming 
structure shall not be reconstructed or structurally altered unless such alteration shall result 
in removing the conditions of the building which render it nonconforming except as 
follows: 
Therefore, the use of the storage building (20' x 30' shed) and all other structures 
built on the Jeppesen/Smith property after the zoning was changed must conform with the 
use regulation of the zone which is residential and not agricultural. Morrison v. Home, 
12 Utah2d 131 363 P.2d 1113 (Utah 1963). 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-51 l(3)(b) provides: 
(b) A municipality may prohibit the reconstruction or restoration of a noncomplying 
structure or terminate the nonconforming use of the structure if: 
(ii) the property owner has voluntarily demolished a majority of the noncomplying 
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structure or the building that houses the nonconforming use. 
The Board declined to consider whether the Smiths had a nonconforming use of the 
storage building and/or other structures located on the property for agricultural purposes to 
house farm animals or to milk dairy cows and goats at the November 4, 2009 Board 
meeting. At page 28 of the transcribed minutes [R. 147], the following occurred: 
Carlsen: "Well I wouldn't mind cows grazing or horses grazing, but...but I don't want 
cow manure right on my fence when...because that's where they milk the cows, right on 
my fence line-right in the storage building on the fence line. I have no objection as far as 
cows grazing or..." 
Toolson: "You have no objection to cows back there at all grazing. It's where they milk 
the cows that..." 
Carlsen: "Yes." 
Toolson: "...that you don't... And that process, probably twice a day, takes 15-20 
minutes?" 
Carlsen: "Well he stays opens, his garage doors, and they were extremely noisy. Because 
I have Mr. Smith and his son there staring...standing at the fence when...looking through 
my back door, if I have my door open during the summer months." 
McRae: "Well we can't control where they're milking the cows. The only...only issue 
before us is whether the animal rights exists and what species they are. As far as, you 
know, where the... the milking takes place or where the cattle roam with the ... property, 
we don't have any jurisdiction on that." 
Carlsen: "Well, the property is fence off now, so it..." 
McRae: "It wouldn't be an issue?" 
Carlsen: "Well it's fenced off. So the animals are on... closer to my property rather than 
closer to their residence." 
The Smiths on the first page in their Application for Board of Adjustment [R. 42] 
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made a mark next to Non-conforming use indicating that their application was for a 
determination of all nonconforming uses. All nonconforming use issues regarding the 1 
Smith property was therefore before the Smithfield Board of Adjustment at the November 
4 Board meeting including any abandonment and/or conversion of use issues such as the 
conversion from a nonconforming use to a conforming use and vice versa. 
The Smithfield Board of Adjustment had jurisdiction and duties under § 
17.20.030(B.) of the Smithfield City Code to determine all nonconforming use issues 
before them including the issue of the nonconforming use of the storage building for 
agricultural purposes to house animals or to milk cows and goats including the issue of the 
extension of the storage building by the Smiths to house goats, animals, and fowl. The 
issue of the Smiths' conversion of the property from a nonconforming use to conforming 
uses by fencing substantial portions of the property for the conforming uses such as a fixed 
dog run; large garden area; and chicken coup area were also relevant issues which should 
have been decided by the Board. 
The pertinent part of the provisions of § 17.16.040(A)(2) of the Smithfield City 
Code provides: 
Whenever a nonconforming use has been changed to a conforming use, such use 
shall not thereafter be changed to a nonconforming use. 
Carlseir s letter, dated, September 23, 2009 to the Smiths and Smithfield City 
asserted that the storage building was used by George Jeppesen as a storage building to 
store personal property before the property was sold to the Smiths. [R. 100-101] 
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Carlseir s letter, dated, October 4, 2009 addressed to Chief McCoy and copies 
mailed to others, asserted that George and Alice Jeppesen removed their personal property 
and the contents of the storage building to their residence after the Smiths purchased the 
property in January 2008. [R. 104-107] 
Because the storage building was used by the Jeppesens' as a storage building and a 
conforming use, the use of the storage building could not thereafter be altered by the 
Smiths under the provisions of § 17.16.040(A)(2.) of the Smith field City Code and Utah 
Code Ann. § 10-9a-511 to a nonconforming use for agricultural purposes to house animals 
or to milk cows and goats. 
Carlsen in his letter, dated, September 19, 2009, asserted that the animals could not 
be housed or the cows and goats could not be milked in the storage building and its 
extension that was located less than 100 feet from his dwelling. [R. 99] 
The pertinent part of § 17.48.060 of Smithfield City zoning ordinances provides: 
C. Distance between Buildings. No building, structure or enclosure housing 
animals or fowl shall be constructed closer to a dwelling on the same or adjacent lot than 
one hundred (100'). 
The Smithfield City attorney asserted that this ordinance only applies to areas zoned 
agricultural and not residential. In other words, he asserts that it is appropriate within the 
limits Smithfield City to house farm animals within 100 feet of an adjacent property 
owner's dwelling in areas zoned residential, but at the same time such acts are prohibited 
in areas zoned agricultural where it is a conforming use to house animals on the property. 
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This ordinance does applies to the Smith property as provided under § 17.04.040 of 
the general provisions of Smithfield City Zoning ordinances that provides: 
Whenever higher or more restrictive standards are established by the provisions of any 
other applicable statute, ordinance, or regulation that are established by the provisions of 
this title, the provisions of such other statute, ordinance, or regulation shall govern. 
Article I, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution requires that the ordinance, § 
17.48.060,C. of Smithfield City Code that prohibits farm animals or fowl from being 
housed closer than 100 feet from an adjacent property owners dwelling is a law of a 
general nature which should have uniform operation throughout Smithfield City where the 
farm animals or fowl are being housed. Whether the farm animals or fowl are being 
housed in an area zoned agricultural or whether they are being housed in an area zoned 
residential under the owner's assertion of nonconforming animal rights use, there is no 
rational basis for the distinction. 
The Smiths assert that Part A of § 17.16.060 of Smithfield City Nonconforming 
Animal rights ordinance authorizes them to substitute a dairy milking cow for the steers 
that were previously housed by the Jeppesens before they purchased the property. The 
proper interpretation of Part A of the ordinance is that the ordinances imposes limitations 
and restrictions and does not accord any entitlements. Part A of the ordinance specifically 
states: "Where animal rights are properly established the following applies: " 
Part A of the ordinance required the Smiths to first establish every element under 
Part B of the ordinance before Part A could be applied, "animals and/or fowls must 
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accompany lots and/or building for a period of not less than thirty (30) days per 
calendar year.-' 
The Smiths failed to produce any evidence that a dairy cow did accompany any 
building on Parcel 08-060-0018 for a period of thirty (30) days per calendar year since the 
zoning was changed in March 1970 to residential because all buildings and structures were 
built after the Jeppesens purchased the land from the Ericksons in year of 1986. 
The record in this case is totally devoid of any evidence that the Smiths had any 
existing animal right use of any building or structure located on Parcel No. 08-060-0018, 
and particularly the storage building as provided under the provisions of § 17.16.060, et 
seq. of SmithfiekTs zoning ordinances and Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-511, et seq.. 
This Court in Rogers v. West Valley City, 2006 UT App 302, n.6, stated: However, 
other court have stated that nonconforming uses should be restricted or eliminated 
because they "distract from the effectiveness of comprehensive land use regulation, often 
resulting in lower property values and blight. (Citations omitted.). ("We are in accord 
with the State's thesis that there is a trend increasingly looking with disfavor upon 
nonconforming uses. "). ' 
The purpose of SmithfiekTs nonconforming use provisions under § 17.16.010 of 
the Smithfield City Code also states Smithfield City's intent to eliminate nonconforming 
uses as follows: 
To control and gradually eliminate those uses of land or structures, which although legal at 
the time of their establishment do not now conform to the use regulations of the district 
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within which they are situated. Such uses shall be deemed nonconforming uses. 
Likewise, it is intended to control and gradually eliminate structures which although legal 
at the time of their erection, do not now conform to the height, bulk and location < 
regulation of the district within which they are situated. Such structures shall be deemed 
to be nonconforming structures. Any structure or use which was permitted prior to the 
enactment of this title, but which is designated by this title as a conditional use, shall not 
be considered a nonconforming use, and shall not be subject to the provisions of this 
chapter. 
The decision of the Smithfield Board of Adjustment that granted the Smiths a 
nonconforming use in a district zoned residential to allow two milking cows that requires ; 
milking twice daily violated the intent provisions under § 17.16.010 to gradually eliminate 
all nonconforming uses. The Board in this case unlawfully expanded the nonconforming 
use of land by allowing the Smiths to milk dairy cows and house animals in a building or 
structure that were built on the land numerous years after the zoning was changed to 
residential. The Board's decision in this case was therefore arbitrary, capricious, and/or 
illegal. 
(ii). The Board's decision that granted the Smiths nonconforming animal 
rights to two head of cattle was arbitrary, capricious, and/or illegal because there 
was not sufficient evidence adduced by the Smiths with regard to the number of 
cattle on the property at the same time for a period of thirty (30) days per calendar 
year since the zoning was changed to residential on March 19, 1970. 
(a). The Board improperly counted a calf, the offspring of the milking cow as 
one head of two head of cattle for the calendar year of 2009. 
Margaret Smith at the November 4, 2009 Board meeting on page 14 of the minutes, 
[R. 133] stated: 
Margaret Smith: uWelL I wanted to say, the reason why we got goats is we have children 
who have allergies to milk. So that's why we have them. And we thought because we 
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were mistaken, that we didn't have that right. So we were in the process of ...We had a 
cow that was pregnant. And so in the process, that... because when the goats get started 
they are extremely noisy. And we tried to get rid of them. So, you know that was part of 
our intention of why we did that. And then we traded to a cow. So that was why... 
The pertinent parts of Margaret Smith's letter, dated, October 29, 2009, [R. 50] she 
stated: 
When Frank Keepers, on June 25, 2009, came and told us that someone had complained 
about our animals we went in the next day to Smithfield City and talked to Char about 
what we needed to do. We told her that we were already selling them (because we had a 
milk cow that was due to calf soon) but that we needed time to wean the kids. We had 
them sold within three weeks. Two of which we took to the auction because we could not 
get buyers for them 
When we were told by the chief of police in Smithfield that we needed to remove our 
animals we moved our cow and calf that day, Monday, and gave away our chickens on that 
Thursday........ 
The letter of Margaret Smith shows that during the calendar year of 2009 there was 
one milking cow and a calf on the Smith property. [R. 50] The calf was the offspring of 
the milking cow and had not attained the age of 6 months before being removed from the 
property in September, 2009 and before the Board meeting. The calf being born after 
Margaret Smith talked to Char in the Smithfield City Offices on June 26, 2009 would not 
have attained the age of 6 months during the calendar year of 2009. 
Part A. of § 17.16.060 of the Smithfield City Code provides: 
A. Where animal rights are properly established the following applies, species follow 
species, i.e., cattle must follow cattle, horses follow horses, chickens, etc. Numbers may 
not be increased except offspring in which case the offspring may stay at the 
mother's side, until six (6) months of age. Swine are not allowed in the confines of the 
city except where they have been kept continuously since March 19, 1970, and in areas of 
agriculture. 
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The Board counted the calf as one of two head of cattle for the calendar year of 
2009. The record also shows that the Board was going to allow the Smiths a third head of 
cattle for the calendar year of 2009: 
The following discussion occurred at pages 36 and 37 [R. 155-156] of the minutes: 
D. Smith: "I'm talking about why we can't put three head of cattle on it still to the next 
sixty days. The grass is kind of gone so we would have to feed them hay." 
McRae: "Well if...if this is the only calendar year in question..." 
D. Smith: "Uh-huh." 
McRae: "And is it?" 
D. Smith: "Yeah." 
McRae: "Okay" 
McRae: "Yeah, do the statements give a number?" 
M. Smith: "Can I make a comment? I believe we only had two cows last year. So, really 
truly, it's 'Cause Dad only had two cows left. So, we need to clarify that. Sorry." 
The Smiths assert that the calf should be counted by the Board as one of two head 
for the calendar year of 2009. Once the Board has rendered its decision that the Smiths 
are allowed two head of cattle, the Smiths can assert that they are allowed to have two 
milking cows and invoke Part A of § 17.16.060 which would allow them one additional 
calf for each milking cow or in the alternative they would be allowed one steer, one 
milking cow, and one calf under Part A. 
Clearly, the Board's decision counting the calf as one of two head of cattle for the 
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calendar year 2009 was arbitrary, capricious, and/or illegal. 
(b). The undisputed evidence also shows there was not sufficient land or grass 
on Parcel # 08-060-0018 during the calendar year of 2008 to graze any cattle for a 
thirty day period because of the Smiths' other uses of the property to house and 
graze approximately eight (8) goats, numerous chickens, and their conforming use of 
the property to house a pet dog; large garden area; and other uses. 
Dale Smith throughout the board meeting asserted that there have always been three 
(3) steers on the property. His claims that there have always been three (3) steers on the 
property was discredited and disputed by his wife, Margaret Smith, whereby on page 37 
[R. 156] of the minutes she states: "Can I make a comment ? I believe we only had hvo 
cows last year. So, we need to clarify that. Sorry. " 
Carlsen stated to the Board on page 19 of the minutes, [R. 138] that during the 
calendar year, 2008, the two steers were exclusively on the Erickson property and were 
never on the Jeppesen/Smith property. 
Dale Smith on page 22 of the minutes [R. 141] stated: 
D. Smith: "You know, we moved them from one piece back to the other, you know." 
Carlseirs statement regarding that the two steers being exclusively housed on the 
Erickson property and not on the Jeppesen/Smith property during the calendar year of 
2008 was corroborated by the evidence which shows that the Smith's used their property 
which consists of approximately .42 of land for numerous other purposes. The evidence 
shows they housed and grazed up to eight goats, numerous chickens in a large chicken 
coup area: a dog in a fixed dog run area; a large fenced garden area, 25' X 120'; and the 
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photos in the record shows that the Smiths used their land for the storage of two trailers 
and a large amount of firewood. i 
Margaret Smith in her letter, dated, October 29, 2009, [R. 50] stated under 
paragraph number two: On June 28, one of goats got out of our pasture into Mr. Carlsen's 
property and eat some of his roses. He called and we ran down and got her. We kept 
them in an enclosure until we sold them. 
{ 
A reasonable inference can be drawn from Margaret Smith's statement that they 
allowed the numerous goats to graze in the pasture on the Smith property up until one of 
the goats escaped and trespassed upon Carlsen\s property in June, 2009. 
The evidence corroborates Carlsen's claim that there were no cows or steers on the 
Smith property during the calendar year of 2008 because the evidence shows that the 
Smiths used the property for other uses such as housing and grazing numerous goats in the 
pasture and numerous other uses such as a large chicken coup area; 25' x 120' garden area; 
20' x 30' storage building area; and a fixed dog run area. A reasonable inference can be 
drawn from this evidence that there was not sufficient land or grass to graze two steers for 
a thirty day period during the calendar year of 2008 for the Smiths to establish animal 
rights to have two steers for the calendar year of 2008. 
Dale Smith at page 5 of the minutes [R.124] stated that he had lived there for 22 
years prior to the meeting. The Smiths would have began living at this location in the year 
of 1987. Therefore, Dale and Margaret Smith would not have any personal knowledge as 
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to how many steers, horses or other animals were on the property between the time the 
zoning was changed in March, 1970 to the year of 1987. 
Board member McRae at page 37 of the minutes asked the following question. 
McRae: "Yeah, do the statements give a number?" 
The Affidavit of Roger Swane.r does not give any numbers as to how many cows 
were on the Smith property at any given time or during any calendar year. 
The Affidavit of George and Alice Jeppesen does not give any numbers as to how 
many cows or horses were on the property at any given time or during any calendar year. 
The Affidavit of Larry E. Draper does not give any numbers as to how many cows 
were on any property at any given time or during any calendar year. 
The unsigned Statement of Gilbert and Martha Hansen does not give any numbers 
as to how many cows or horses was on the property at any given time or during any 
calendar year. 
There was no evidence adduced by Smiths as to how many cows or horses were on 
the property at any given time or during any calendar year between the period that the 
zoning was changed in March 1970 until the calendar year of 1987. 
(iii). The Board's decision that granted the Smiths nonconforming animal 
rights on the same property that was previously converted to conforming uses under 
§ 17.16.040(A)(2) of the Smithfield City Code was arbitrary, capricious, and/or 
illegal, and the conversion of the property to conforming uses constituted an 
abandonment of their animal rights under § 17.16.040(B) of the Smithfield City 
Code. 
The pertinent part of Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801, provides: 
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(3) [c] A final decision of a land use authority or an appeal authority is valid if the 
decision is supported by the substantial evidence in the record and is not arbitrary, 
capricious or illegal. 
[d] A determination of illegality requires a determination that the decision, 
ordinance or regulation violates a law, statute, or ordinance in effect at the time the 
decision was made or the ordinance or regulation adopted. 
The abandonment issue was raised by petitioner in the Board Meeting. At pages 
18-19 of the transcribed minutes,[R. 173-174] Mr. Carlsen stated: 
CARLSEN: "Yes. I... bought my house in 2007, July 2007. There was no cows on the 
Smith property in that time until the fall of 2008. The steers that they talked about were 
...were in the pasture on the Erickson property. There's a fence and a gate between the 
Smith property and the Erickson property. And the two horses they talked about 
is...they're housed mostly on the Erickson property. And another ... and I believe there's 
been an abandonment of their animal rights by not having animals during that period of 
time. "Emphasis added" 
And another issue I have is that where it says there's ... along there is 199 foot line to the 
property. That land stops 24 feet to make a large garden and a chicken coupe and a dog 
run and any use of the property for other purposes." I mean it's, ah..." 
The pertinent part of the provisions of § 17.16.040(A)(2.) of the Smithfield City 
Code provides: 
Whenever a nonconforming use has been changed to a conforming use, such use 
shall not thereafter be changed to a nonconforming use. 
Carlsen's October 27, 2009 letter addressed to Smithfield City which is part of the 
record [R. 111-112] states: 
The actual land that George and Alice Jeppesen transferred to the Smiths on 
October 20, 2009 which is to the east of my property involves and constitutes a total of .42 
acres of land. The property that the Smiths' claim they have animal rights is Ninety- two 
feet wide and one hundred and ninety-nine feet long. 
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The Smiths built a fence along the entire 199 foot length of the property before 
ownership of the property was transferred to them by George Jeppesen. They divided the 
property by fencing and horse panels into numerous sections, including an area for a large 
garden; a chicken coup area; and an area for a dog run. I have attached pictures showing 
how the property has been divided by fencing and horse panels. The wooden blue fence 
shown in the pictures was the property line dividing the property that the Smiths purchased 
from George Jeppesen and the Smith's residential property. The photo shows additional 
metal fencing to the south of the blue wooden fence. Additionally, when I purchased my 
property, there was an existing fence that separated the property that George Jeppesen sold 
to the Smiths and the property owned by Ralph Lynn Erickson. 
The Smiths' now claim they have animal rights on the same property that they have 
now converted to other uses such as a large garden and dog run by fencing and horse 
panels. It would now appear that there is not sufficient land to house additional animals 
on the .42 acre of property. 
There should be no question that the Smiths abandoned their nonconforming 
animal rights by converting substantial portions of Parcel No. 08-060-0018 to conforming 
uses such as a large chicken coup area, large garden area, and a fixed dog run area. The 
photos also shows that the property is being used by the Smiths for the conforming use of 
storage of large amounts of firewood and the storage of numerous trailers. [R. 115, 116] 
The Smiths assert that the 25' x 120' garden area is opened up to the cow in the fall. 
However, the photos furnished by Carlsen with his letter of October, 27, 2009 [R. 115, 
116] shows that there was no breach in the metal fencing to allow any animal access to the 
garden area in the fall of 2009 before the November 4, Board meeting. Also, in the year of 
2008, the two head of cattle grazing exclusively on the Erickson property were not 
allowed access to the garden; chicken coup; and fixed dog run areas. 
Additionally, the Smiths are barred under § 17.16.040(A)(2.) of the Smithfield City 
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Code from converting that land to nonconforming uses once they converted it to a 
conforming use such as a garden area and dividing the property by metal fencing. * 
Because of the Smiths' conversion of a substantial portion of the property to a 
conforming use, the question then becomes is whether there is sufficient remaining land 
after the conversion to accord the Smiths with the same animal rights that the Jeppesen 
enjoyed when they owned the property prior to the Smiths when the entire parcel was a 
pasture area with the exception of the storage building that the Jeppesens built after the 
zoning change and is located next to Carlseir s property. 
The pertinent part of § 17.04.070 of the general provisions of Smithfield City 
zoning ordinances states: 
FARM ANIMALS. The keeping of animals and fowl commonly used for food or fiber 
production, as a beast of burden, commercial purposes, or for pleasure. The density 
allowed in the various zones shall be as defined in this title: 
FARM ANIMALS LIMITED. The keeping of not more than two (2) horses, two (2) 
cows, two (2) llamas, four (4) sheep, four (4) goats, twenty (20) rabbits, forty (40) 
chickens, forty (40) pheasants, ten (10) turkeys, ten (10) ducks, ten (10) geese, three (3) 
ostriches, four (4) emus, and forty (40) pigeons, provided the keeping of pigs on any lot is 
prohibited and not more than three (3) of the above listed species of animals or fowl are 
permitted at any one time. 
An additional number of animals or fowl equal to fifty percent (50%) of the above listed 
numbers may be kept for each ten thousand (10,000) square feet over and above one acre, 
exclusive often thousand (10,000) square feet for the residence. 
§ 17.04.040 of the general provisions of Smithfield City Zoning ordinances 
provides: 
Whenever higher or more restrictive standards are established by the provisions of 
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any other applicable statute, ordinance, or regulation that are established by the provisions 
of this title, the provisions of such other statute, ordinance, or regulation shall govern. 
The Smiths assert that nonconforming animal rights are perpetual and cannot be 
limited by the Farm Animal Limitations ordinance enacted by Smithfield City or 
terminated because of the Smiths' conversion of the property to conforming uses. The 
Smiths assert that even in the event they converted the property to a conforming use such 
as building a home, they would still have nonconforming animal rights use. 
The Smiths' assertions should be rejected because property owners whose property 
are in areas zoned agricultural or agricultural-residential with farm animals rights are also 
limited to number of farm animals in certain areas of the city under the provisions of § 
17.48.050 of the Smithfield City Code. 
The Smiths after converting the .42 acre of property to conforming uses, lack the 
one acre necessary under § 17.04.070 to house and graze two cows. 
In Rogers v. West Valley City, 2006 UT App 302 \ 9, 142 P.3d 554, at least one 
West Valley City Board member found it significant that during the two years when the 
horses were absent from the property, Ms. Kirby maintained it as a pasture and did not 
attempt to develop or otherwise transform it. In it decision, the Board stated that animals 
had historically been kept on the Property and the that "the property owners did not intend 
to abandon that use for the keeping of animals." 
The Smiths and Jeppesens in the case have transformed the use of the .42 acre of 
land, first by the Jeppesen building a 20' x 30' storage building. The Smiths upon 
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purchasing the property from the Jeppesen, further transformed the use of the property by 
fencing off substantial portions of the property for a 25f x 120' garden area; large chicken 
coup area to house four (4) pet hens; and a fenced fixed dog run area. Others areas of the 
property were transformed into the storage of large amount of firewood and the storage of 
trailers. 
Abandonment is defined under § 17.16.040(B) of the Smithfield City Code as follows: 
1. A use shall be deemed to have ceased when it has been discontinued either 
temporary or permanently for a period of one year or more, whether or not with the intent 
to abandon said use. 
2. If said nonconforming use is discontinued for a continuous period of one year or 
more, the use shall be considered abandoned and any future use of such land shall conform 
to the provisions of the zone which it is located. 
(iv). The Board's decision that granted the Smiths nonconforming animal 
rights was arbitrary, capricious, and/or illegal because the Board members declined 
to separate the cattle housed on the lot owned by Ralph Lynn Erickson with the 
cattle housed on the lot owned by the Smiths in making their determination of 
nonconforming animal rights. 
Dale Smith at the Board meeting held on November 4, 2009 on page 5 [R. 124] of 
the minutes stated: My under standing from the documentation is we \e got there have 
always been cows on there and we are asking that we are allowed to keep cows on that 
property to keep the grass down and to keep them on the Erickson property. 
The Smiths in support of their request to be allowed animal rights and have cows 
on the Erickson property provided a letter from Larry E. Draper which states: 777/5 letter is 
to help Dale and Margaret Smith with their request to have animal rights on the Erickson 
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property. There has been beef on that property every summer since before 1970, and 
after, up to the present. [R. 57] 
Dale Smith was informed by Char Izatt that he lacked standing to request animal 
rights on the Erickson property because by ordinance only the owner of the property has 
standing to make a request for nonconforming animal rights. 
The Smithfield City Building Inspector, Jon Wells made the following statement at 
the November 4, Board meeting on page 7 & 8 of the minutes [R. 126-127]: 
Wells: "Title to that piece of property..Mr. Draper we can ask an Officer to have you 
removed if you would like. 
The title to that piece of property that is highlighted on your map was transferred in 2005 
to Mr. Jeppesen. Whether or not.we don't know what happened prior to that to the 
piece of property is referred to in a lot of these letters as the Erickson property. So 
up until 2005 it was under the name of Erickson, okay, if there were animal rights 
established it was on the Erickson property, which until 2005 that piece was part of 
the Erickson property that was on that block. In 2009 the deed to that property was 
transferred to the Smith's, okay, in fact it was just recently within the last month, 
okay. "Emphasis added" 
Carlsen in a letter similar to a Rule 60(b) motion, dated, November 9, 2009, 
[R.l 18] requested the Board to convene and vacate their decision based upon the false 
information provided by Jon Wells to the Board with regards to ownership of the property 
based upon the Warranty Deed attached to the letter that is part of the record before the 
court. 
The board did convene on May 10, 2010 regarding the transcript of the minutes but 
declined to vacate its earlier decision. [R. 365-368] 
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The board members at the meeting held on November 4, 2009 declined to separate 
the Smith property. Parcel No. 08-060-0018 from the adjacent property owned by Ralph 
Lynn Erickson, Parcel No. 08-060-0012: 
At page 20 of the minutes, [R. 175] Board member, McRae states: 
McRae: "Maybe, perhaps, before it had merged with this...this other parcel. Do 1 
understand you correctly there.? 
At page 21 of the minutes, [R. 176] Board member, Toolson states: 
Toolson: "No the whole property back there. That whole property back there. I, I think..I 
think we're getting to off this. I think we need to look at that as exactly what it is, that 
piece of property back there, you know. Because I think we can get a little off center 
here if we talk about the Erickson or the Jeppesen property. "Emphasis added" 
At page 23 of the minutes, [R. 178] the board members stated: 
Izatt: "I just have a request after you hear the public hearing because you need to 
remember that he's... When you make that Motion, that you indicate ...you refer to that 
parcel, the 0018 parcel, okay? Whichever one of you make the Motion. The Motion has 
to legally refer to that parcel." 
McRae: "So is 0018, then the same thing as this? I mean, they're all one contiguous 
piece?" 
McRae: "Okay." 
Wilson: "Yeah, well this...this line here indicates that's all one piece right there." 
Toolson: "Oh, yeah. Okay." 
McRae: "This is part of 0018." 
Toolson: "Yes, yes. Yes." 
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The Board merged the Smith property (Parcel 0018) with the Erickson property 
(Parcel 0012) to make it determination as to whether the Smiths had nonconforming 
animal rights on Parcel 08-060-0018. The record is clear that they refused or otherwise 
failed to separate the Smith property from the Erickson property in making a 
determination as to whether the Smiths had nonconforming animal rights and whether the 
Smiths abandoned their animal rights on Parcel 0018 by exclusively housing two steers on 
the Erickson property during the calendar hear of 2008 as per the statement of Carlsen 
before the Board at page 18-19 of the minutes. [R. 173-174] 
(v). The Board's decision that granted the Smiths nonconforming animal 
rights was arbitrary, capricious, and/or illegal because the owners of the property 
abandoned their nonconforming uses and animal rights. 
The Affidavit of George and Alice Jeppesen show that all structures and buildings 
on the Erickson property used for agricultural purposes such as to house animals or fowl 
were abandoned by the structures collapsed from deterioration prior to the Jeppesens' 
purchasing part of the property with a right of way from the Ericksons in the year of 1986. 
Alice Jeppesen in her statement to the Board at the meeting held on November 4, 
2009, stated on page 19 [R. 138]of the minutes as follows: 
Alice Jeppesen: I'm Alice Jeppesen, and we owned property that was sold to the Smiths. 
And until my husband got sick in the hospital for two years, we did have cows and horses 
on all that property because we took care of the house and property for Ralph, and 
irrigated it to water many of these things and took care of the property for Ralph because 
he was gone at this time. So yes, there have been there have been horses and cows. 
Dale Smith asserted that he had cows on the property during this two years period 
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in which Alice Jeppesen stated that they did not have cows on the property because of her 
husband's hospitalization for a two year period. . , \ 
Dale Smith at page 5 of the minutes of the Board meeting also asserted that the 
aerial photo taken of the property in the year of 2006 also shows that animals were housed 
on the property. [R. 124] 
A close view of the aerial photo [R. 52]with a magnifying glass disputes Dale 
Smith's statement that there were cows on the property. The aerial photo support the 
statements of Alice Jeppesen that there was no cows on the property for a period of two 
years, 2006-2007. The photos furnished by Carlsen to the Board shows a wooden feeder 
with a plastic top which would be approximately the same size of a cow. The aerial photo 
shows the same wooden feeder on the west end of the property and a watering trough on 
the north end of the property but no cows on the property or the adjacent property owned 
by the Ericksons. 
Carlsen also made a statement to the Board in a letter, dated, October 4, 2009 [R. 
104-107] and at the Board meeting that there were no cows on either properties when he 
purchased his property in 2007 which also supports the statement of Alice Jeppesen that 
there were no cows on the property for a two year period. Carlsen's letter stated that the 
Smiths brought two horses onto the two properties in the year of 2007. This statement is 
supported by the letter of Gilbert and Martha Hansen. 
(vi). The record of the Smithfield Board of Adjustment filed with the District 
Court was not accurate and was incomplete. 
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The minutes of the November 4, 2009 meeting before the Smithfield Board of 
Adjustment were not approved by the Board before their filing with the District Court. 
This is evidenced by the minutes of Board meeting held on May 10, 2010. [R. 365-368] 
Carlsen in his letter, dated October 27, 2009 [R. 112] makes reference to attached photos 
showing a wooden blue fence. The photos furnished by Carlsen in the Board record were 
colored photos [R. 108-110, 115-116]. The aerial photo of the property [R. 52] may have 
also been in color. Also numerous documents in the record contained items that were 
highlighted in yellow. It appears that the record filed with the District Court in this case 
shows that black and white copies of these colored documents and photos were filed and 
not the original documents in record that was before the Board. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801(7)(a) required the BOA to transmit to the reviewing 
court the record of its proceeding, including its minutes, findings, orders. 
The original record of BOA was not transmitted, only black and white copies of its 
record whereby numerous documents and exhibits were in color. This is not a complete 
record and is grounds for reversal of the district court decision. Morra v. Grand County, 
2010 UT21, 230 P.3d 1022. 
ISSUE II 
Whether Board Member, Reed Toolson was required to disqualify himself for 
his stated bias and prejudices as required under the Due Process Clause. 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that a hearing 
officer in administrative type proceedings to disqualify themselves because of personal 
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( 
bias or prejudices. Dairy Products Services, Inc. v. City ofWellsvilte, 2000 UT 81, ^  52-
54 13 P.3d 581 citing V-l Oil Co., 939 P.2d at 1197. 
At page 20-21 of the minutes [R. 139-140] Board member, Reed Toolson made the 
following statements: 
Toolson: "Mr. Carlsen, I don't know you very well, but I want to refer back to George 
Jeppesen's statement in here, and there's a few things I...just to state, before I, you know, 
point out some of these things. 1 haven't known you very long, but I've known George a 
lot of years and 1 have found him to be a very honest person in work and outside of work, 
and in business and outside of business. So when...when he made this statement-his wife, 
talked to...talked just a minute ago...stated-Tm going to believe this gentlemen. I will 
believe George because I've never known him to lie 
The problem with George Jeppesen's statements in his and his wife's Affidavit is 
that it was recanted by Alice Jeppesen at the meeting at page 19 of the minutes [R. 138] 
/ 'm Alice Jeppesen, and we owned the property that was sold to the Smiths. And until my 
husband got sick in the hospital for two years, we did have cows and horses on that 
property 
Board member, Toolson's stated bias and prejudices towards Carlsen was because 
he did not know him very long and he had personal and business dealings with George 
Jeppesen for numerous years. Clearly, any judge in the trial courts of the State of Utah 
would be required to disqualify themselves under identical circumstances. The Smiths 
should not be granted existing nonconforming animal rights on the basis of a Board 
members personal relationships with the witnesses for the Smith and with the Smiths 
themselves as per Carlsen's letter of November 5, 2009. [R. 117] 
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ISSUE IV 
Whether the District Court erred and abused its discretion in granting the 
Smiths' Motion to Intervene and whether the Smithfield City Board of Adjustment 
could delegate their legal duties to a private citizen such as the Smiths in this matter, 
and by allowing the BOA to join the Smiths' Memorandum after the pleadings were 
closed. 
The Smiths in this case could not answer the question espoused by Judge Willmore 
at the August 30, 2010 hearing at page 7 of the transcript: Why did it take seven months 
for your client to file a motion to intervene? 
When considering all of the facts and circumstances of this case as espoused by the 
parties at the August 30, 2010 hearing [Tr. 1-20], the district court abused it discretion in 
granting the Smiths Motion to Intervene under URCP, Rule 24 after the Smiths received 
notice of the pending matter seven months earlier and after the case became ripe for 
summary judgment. The Smiths' Motion to Intervene was untimely. Republic Insurance 
Group v. Boman, 11A P.2d 1130 (Utah 1989). 
Carlsen filed objections to the BOA joinder in the Smiths Memorandum after the 
pleadings were closed and after two Notice to Submit were filed with the court. [R. 391-
394, 371, 284] The BOA was improperly allowed joinder in the Smiths memorandum. 
STATEMENT REGARDING ADDENDUM 
Carlsen submits that because of the bulk of the Addendum to the Brief of Appellant 
that the Addendum is prepared and submitted separately. 
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4 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the District Court affirming or modifying the decision of the BOA 
should be reversed because the BOA decision granting the Smiths nonconforming uses 
and nonconforming animal rights to two head of cattle or two milking cows was arbitrary, 
capricious, and or illegal and the Board's decision should therefore be reversed 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on this 31sl day of May, 2011. 
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